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Incubators of Sea Power
Vessel Training Centers and the Modernization of the PLAN Surface Fleet
Ryan D. Martinson

Summary
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building modern surface combatants faster than any
other navy in the world. Before these new ships can be deployed, however, their crews must learn
how to effectively operate them across the range of missions for which they were designed. In the
PLAN, this “basic training” largely occurs at specialized organizations called Vessel Training
Centers (VTCs). Since their creation in 1980, VTCs have played a key role in generating combat
power for the fleet. But as China’s naval ambitions have grown, the VTCs have been forced to adapt.
Since the early 2000s, and especially since 2012, they have faced tremendous pressure to keep pace
with the rapid expansion and modernization of the PLAN surface fleet and its growing mission set,
improve the standards and quality of vessel training, and uphold the integrity of training evaluations.
This report argues that the PLAN’s VTCs have generally risen to the challenge, ensuring that new
and recently-repaired ships can quickly reach operational units in a fairly high state of readiness.
Introduction
China’s first Type 055 cruiser, the Nanchang, was commissioned on January 21, 2020 in Qingdao,
Shandong, home to the Northern Theater Command Navy.1 Commentators naturally fixated on the
physical characteristics of the new ship: her length and displacement, the numbers and dimensions of
her missile cells, her dual-band radar, and her “stealthy” lines.2 By these (and other) metrics, the
Nanchang was among the most advanced warships in the world.3 But a ship, no matter how
advanced, can only realize its full combat potential if it is operated by a competent crew.4
Development of that competence involves months—possibly years—of intensive training under the
guidance of dedicated and knowledgeable instructors.
For the Nanchang, and hundreds of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships preceding her,
that training began immediately upon commissioning, at a specialized unit called a Vessel Training
Center (VTC). These organizations serve the vital function of transforming new or recently-repaired
ships into combat-ready assets. Instructors at VTCs help provide the “basic training” (基础训练) for
ship crews that allows them to be certified for deployment on that platform. Training done at VTCs
serves as the foundation for follow on training with other arms of the navy and the joint force. As
such, PLAN experts often describe VTCs as “incubators” (孵化器) of surface fleet combat power.5
樊永强、李唐 [Fan Yongqiang and Li Tang], 海军 055 型驱逐舰南昌舰入列 [“Navy’s Type 055 Destroyer Nanchang
Enters Service”], 新华网 [Xinhua], January 12, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-01/12/c_1125451631.htm.
1

Franz-Stefan Gady, “China’s Navy Commissions First-of-Class Type 055 Guided Missile Destroyer,” The Diplomat,
January 13, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/chinas-navy-commissions-first-of-class-type-055-guided-missiledestroyer/; KG Chan, “PLA’s Destroyers a ‘Bigger Threat’ Than Carriers,” Asia Times, January 14, 2020,
https://asiatimes.com/2020/01/plas-destroyers-a-bigger-threat-than-carriers/; Andrew Tate, “Chinese Navy’s First Type
055-Class Destroyer Enters Service,” Janes, January 13, 2020, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/chinesenavys-first-type-055-class-destroyer-enters-service.
3
Daniel Caldwell, Joseph Freda, and Lyle J. Goldstein, "China's Dreadnought? The PLA Navy's Type 055 Cruiser and Its
Implications for the Future Maritime Security Environment," China Maritime Report No. 5, China Maritime Studies
Institute, February 2020, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/5.
4
At an event commemorating the Qing Navy’s losses to a materially inferior Japanese Navy in the First Sino-Japanese
War (1894-1895), one VTC staff member declared, “Even if it has the most advanced equipment, a military that cannot
treat the training field like a battlefield is just a tiger without teeth and is unable to frighten a true enemy.” Another added,
“No matter how good the equipment, if one cannot adroitly operate it then it is a pile of scrap metal.” 吕廷章，侯瑞 [Lü
Tingzhang and Hou Rui], 夜海讨“战”[“Discussing ‘War’ at Night on the Sea”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], May 16,
2014, p. 2.
2

See for example 正午国防军事 [Midday National Defense and Military Affairs], CCTV-7, April 21, 2022,
https://tv.cctv.com/2022/04/21/VIDEmFMr3n3g91PyDNlIxLNl220421.shtml?spm=C53074552346.P4BWJvVoMUky.0.0
5

Basic training conducted at VTCs is essential to PLAN preparations for high-end conflict in maritime
East Asia, which is the primary focus of China’s current military strategy. 6 The surface force,
working in conjunction with PLAN aviation, submarines, and coastal defense missile batteries plus
relevant units from the PLA Air Force and PLA Rocket Forces, would be expected to vie for
“command of the sea” (制海权) in key operational areas within the first island chain and contest U.S.
operations in waters beyond.7 Yet very little is known about the VTCs charged with helping them
prepare to do that.8 This report seeks to fill this knowledge gap by providing an overview of VTCs—
who they are, what they do, and how they do it—and examining some of the main factors affecting
their effectiveness.
In particular, this report tracks recent efforts by the PLAN’s VTCs to evolve to meet the
requirements of a rapidly expanding and modernizing surface fleet.9 This expansion/modernization
began in the early 2000s, with the development of new classes of destroyers, frigates, and fast attack
craft, but has accelerated since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012. In the last decade, the PLAN
has invested massive resources into new construction of advanced surface combatants, from stealthy
corvettes intended for “near seas” operations to amphibious assault ships designed to project Chinese
naval power throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond.10 The PLAN’s embrace of surface warfare has
placed huge stresses on the VTCs—to train more ship crews, to keep pace with new technologies and
mission sets, and to ensure that training quality matches Beijing’s aspirations for a “world-class”
navy.11 This report argues that despite some enduring challenges the PLAN’s VTCs have generally
succeeded in adapting to these new requirements.

“China’s Military Strategy,” Information Office of the State Council, May 2015,
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm; M. Taylor Fravel, Active
Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2019), p. 232.
7
Ryan D. Martinson, “Counter-Intervention in Chinese Naval Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 44, no. 2 (2021), pp.
265-287. One 2015 article by then PLAN South Sea Fleet VTC political commissar Zhang Haiwen states that “surface
warfare officers/enlisted will be the main combat force in future wars” (舰艇官兵是未来战争的主要作战力量). 张海文
[Zhang Haiwen], 铸魂，铸剑，铸形 [“Forge the Soul, Forge the Sword, and Forge the Mold”] 人民海军 [People’s
Navy], March 16, 2015, p. 3. In a high-end conflict, PLAN surface combatants will likely operate as components of three
main types of task forces: first, as members of surface actions groups (or “ship formations,” 舰艇编队); second, as
members of aircraft carrier strike groups; and third, as members of amphibious formations.
8
For a brief but useful discussion of VTCs, see Dale C. Rielage, “Chinese Navy Trains and Takes Risks,” Proceedings of
the U.S. Naval Institute, 142, no. 5 (May 2016), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2016/may/chinese-navytrains-and-takes-risks. For a pioneering monograph on PLAN training, see Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens, The
Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, August
2014), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/10/.
9
See Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson, China’s Evolving Surface Fleet (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College
Press, 2017), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/13/
10
Conor M. Kennedy and Daniel Caldwell, “The Type 075 LHD: Development, Missions, and Capabilities,” China
Maritime Report No. 23, China Maritime Studies Institute, October 2022, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsimaritime-reports/23/.
11
Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-Class’ Naval Ambitions,” Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute,
146, no. 8 (August 2020), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/august/deciphering-chinas-world-classnaval-ambitions.
6
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VTCs: An Overview
VTCs serve two core missions. The first is to provide “basic training”12 to crews of newlycommissioned surface vessels and older surface vessels that have completed major repairs, upgrades,
or extended maintenance and need to be prepared to return to active status.13 Most classes of PLAN
surface ships receive basic training at VTCs. This ranges from fast attack craft to hospital ships,
corvettes to cruisers. VTCs are not responsible for training the crews of aircraft carriers. Ships enter
VTCs as “Class 2” (二类) vessels (nondeployable) and, assuming they meet all requirements and
pass all tests, depart for their operational units as deployable assets (“Class 1,” 一类).14
The VTCs second core mission is to conduct formal “evaluations” (考核) to ensure that the ship as a
whole meets basic standards of readiness and that individual sailors meet the training requirements
for their respective posts. These evaluations occur over the course of basic training. Basic training
also culminates in a final “comprehensive training evaluation” (全训合格考核)15 that determines
whether or not the ship can be certified for deployment.
The basic training conducted at VTCs is comparable to “Basic Phase” training done by the U.S.
Navy’s surface force. VTCs themselves are analogues of the U.S. Navy’s Afloat Training Groups.16
Like with the U.S. Navy, basic training received at VTCs lays a tactical and technical foundation for
the crews of individual ships to conduct more advanced training in conjunction with other ships
(“surface action groups,” or ship “formations” in PLAN parlance), other arms of the navy (air,
submarine, etc.), and the joint force.17
The PLAN possesses three VTCs, one for each of its fleets, or “Theater Command Navies” (战区海
军) as they are now called. The Northern Theater Command Navy VTC is located in Qingdao,
Shandong;18 the Eastern Theater Command Navy VTC has facilities in Shanghai and Zhoushan,
According to the PLA’s Dictionary of Military Terms, “basic training” (基础训练) is conducted by both individuals and
units in order to “master basic military knowledge and basic skills.” It is the “precondition for applied training.” see 中国
人民解放军军语 [Dictionary of Military Terms] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, September 2011), p. 306.
12

张永义 [Zhang Yongyi], ed., 海军军事训练学 [Science of Navy Military Training], (Beijing: Military Science Press,
2006), p. 209.
13

吴海超，曹卫民，曹学军 [Wu Haichao, Cao Weimin, and Cao Xuejun], 沐浴在阳光中的航迹 [“A Track Bathed in
Sunlight”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], August 3, 2010, p. 1; 高毅，徐广，王乐 [Gao Yi, Xu Guang, and Wang Le], 多
少惊涛骇浪，才成就了这艘明星战舰 [“How Many Stormy Seas Has it Taken to Become This Famous Warship”], 中国
青年报 [China Youth Daily], May 22, 2015, p. 9, http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2015-05/22/nw.D110000zgqnb_20150522_109.htm.
14

全训 is likely an abbreviation for 全科目训练, literally “all-subject training.” See 刘亚迅，孙宏杰 [Liu Yaxun and
Sun Hongjie], 练强胜仗本领 磨砺胆气血性 [“Train the Ability to Win, Sharpen Boldness and Courage”], 人民海军
[People’s Navy], January 19, 2018, p. 1.
16
For an outline of Basic Phase training and a description of the responsibilities of the Afloat Training Groups, see Surface
Force Training and Readiness Manual, U.S. Department of the Navy, November 1, 2018, pp. 2-4-2-6, 4-13-4-19.
15

刘兵，魏闻晓 [Liu Bing and Wei Wenxiao], 向着打赢的目标，不停地远航—“长春“号驱逐舰舰长胡杰专访
[“Aiming for the Goal of Being Able to Prevail in Combat, Continuously Sailing—An Interview with the CO of the
Destroyer Changchun”], 舰船知识 [Naval & Merchant Ships], no. 6 (June 2019), pp. 26-27. Basic training is the
“precondition” (前提) for combined arms training. See 王庆厚，张森，张庆宝，马宁 [Wang Qinghou, Zhang Sen,
Zhang Qingbo, and Ma Ning], 基础训练，务实能打胜仗根基 [“Basic Training, Foundation for Pragmatically Prevailing
in Battle”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 20, 2020, p. 1.
17

18

The Military Unit Cover Designator (MUCD) for this VTC is 92771. See 2021 Directory of Military Personalities
(Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, March 2021). Confirmation of
Qingdao as the location of the VTC comes from 唐晨，孙秀文，王旅 [Tang Chen, Sun Xiuwen, and Wang Lü], 反潜巡
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Zhejiang;19 and the Southern Theater Command Navy VTC is located in Zhanjiang, Guangdong.20
The VTCs provide training and evaluation for all eligible ships and personnel in the fleets to which
they belong.
Ships are “stationed” (驻训) at VTCs for the duration of basic training.21 This allows the crew to
focus entirely on the task at hand and use the dedicated training equipment and facilities available at
the VTC. There is no explicit timeline within which basic training must be completed, but in practice
it typically takes 6-12 months for a newly-commissioned ship to pass the comprehensive training
evaluation. This differs from the U.S. Navy’s basic phase training, which is intended to last precisely
24 weeks (5.5 months).22
While each VTC has some latitude to decide how it fulfills its training and evaluation missions, all
must strictly adhere to a set of “Outlines on Military Training and Evaluation” (军事训练与考核大
纲, OMTE).23 The PLA issues a general, military-wide OMTE containing key principles that inform
the development of a narrower set of OMTEs for each service.

逻机对潜应召搜索声呐浮标布放阵位优化问题研究 [“Research on Optimization Position of Sonobuoy in AntiSubmarine Call-Search by Anti-Submarine Patrol Aircraft”], 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering], 42, no. 2
(2022), p. 62.
视频点对点，交流面对面 [“Video Teleconference Point-to-Point, Exchange Face-to-Face”], 人民海军 [People’s
Navy], December 19, 2016, p. 2. The MUCD for this VTC is 92246. See 汪少铭，廖继阳，贾小权，董瑞，刘峰 [Wang
Shaoming, Liao Jiyang, Jia Xiaoquan, Dong Rui, and Liu Fen], 一种共享动态缓冲的 MPNoC 路由器设计 [“Design of a
Sharing Dynamic Buffer Router for Multiprocessor System-on-China”], 船电技术 [Ship Electric and Electronic
Engineering], 36, no. 12 (December 2016), p. 49; 王强，汪少铭，刘永葆，贾小权，赵雄飞，董瑞 [Wang Qiang,
Wang Shaoming, Liu Yongbao, Jia Xiaoquan, Zhao Xiongfei , and Dong Rui], 阻尼对三自由度弹性碰撞系统周期运动
倍化分岔的影响研究 [“Period-Doubling Biburcation of Three-Degree-of-Freedom Elastic Collision System Under
Different Damping Coefficients”], 武汉理工大学学报（交通科学与工程版） [Journal of Wuhan University of
Technology (Transportation Science and Engineering)], 39, no 6 (December 2015), p. 1249.
19

The MUCD for this VTC is 91889. See 张俊，胡生亮，杨庆，范学满，贺静波 [Zhang Jun, Hu Shengliang, Yang
Qing, Fan Xueman, and He Jingbo] 基于ＲＣＳ幅值特性相似度的浮空式角反射体布放态势寻优 [“Optimization of
Position Situation of Air-Floating Corner Reflectors Based on Similarity of RCS Amplitude Characteristic”] 海军工程大
学学报 [Journal of Naval University of Engineering], 31, no. 2 (April 2019), p. 32; 张俊，胡生亮，杨庆，范学满，王
聘 [Zhang Jun, Hu Shengliang, Yang Qing, Fan Xueman, and Wang Pin], 异型角反射体阵列寻优研究 [“On
Optimization of Heterotypic Corner Reflector Arrays”], 海军工程大学学报 [Journal of Naval University of Engineering],
31, no. 6 (December 2019), p. 47.
20

The term 驻训 literally means “stationed for training.” For an example of its use, see 朱敏煜，吴政 [Zhu Minyu and
Wu Zheng], 用问题推进训练 以作战牵引考核 [“Use Questions to Advance Training and Combat Operations to Drive
Evaluations”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 11, 2020, p. 1.
21

22

Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual, p. 4-16

Officially, the PLA translates the term 军事训练与考核大纲 as “military training and evaluation program.” It is defined
as follows: “The legal document regulating the content, timing, conditions, standards, and evaluations for military training.
It is the foundational basis for the organization and implementation of military training.” See Dictionary of Military
Terms, p. 301. On the importance of strict adherence to the OMTE, see 张海文 [Zhang Haiwen], 为新型舰艇强筋壮骨
[“Strengthen the Muscles and Bones of New-Type Warships”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], January 11, 2016, p. 3. At the
time this article was written, Zhang was the Political Commissar of the South Sea Fleet VTC. In recent years the PLAN
has highlighted a problem with some units (not necessarily VTCs) failing to fully adhere to the relevant OMTE, as
required. See, for instance, 基础训练一定要按纲施训 [“Basic Training Must Conduct Training According to the
Outline”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 20, 2020, p. 1.
23

4

To date, the PLA has issued three military-wide OMTEs. The first was issued in 2001, going into
effect on January 1, 2002.24 Among other aims, the 2002 OMTE sought to ensure that training
evaluations were true assessments of capabilities instead of “theatrical performance.”25 The 2009
update sought to increase the quantity of combined arms training, focus more on operations in
complex electromagnetic environments, augment use of simulators, expand training for non-war
military operations, increase “confrontation” (i.e., blue/red) training, and raise standards for basic
training.26 These new requirements directly impacted the policies and approaches of the VTCs. Very
little is known about the 2018 OMTE, as the PLA did not allow any media commentary about its
contents.27 Four years later, key themes contained within it remain largely unknown.
Each military-wide OMTE begets a separate set of service-specific OMTEs.28 These documents, in
turn, inform the development of OMTEs for different service arms, and in the case of the PLAN
surface force, OMTEs for each ship class. 29 VTC instructors adhere to existing OMTEs for ships
they are training, and they also help develop OMTEs for new classes of ships.30
VTCs are led by a Director, with the rank of Senior Captain (grade: Division Leader), and a Political
Commissar of the same rank.31 Key staff positions include “trainer captains” (教练舰长), trainers (教
练员), and mission area experts (业务长).32 Holding the rank of captain or senior captain, trainer

The PLA has had “training outlines” (训练大纲) since 1957, but it was not until 2001 that it issued its first outline on
military training and evaluation. See 构建信息化条件下军事训练新体系——解读新一代《军事训练与考核大纲》
[“Building a New System for Military Training under Informatized Conditions—Interpreting the New Generation ‘Outline
on Military Training and Evaluation’ for the New Era”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 1, 2008, p. 3.
24

25

For more on the 2002 and 2009 OMTEs, see Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation
for the 21st Century, Second Edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012), p. 176. 董文久，苏若舟 [Dong Wenjiu and Su
Ruozhou], 新的军事训练与考核大纲颁发 [“The New OMTE is Issued”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 10, 2001.
“Building a New System for Military Training under Informatized Conditions,” p. 3.
See Ken Allen, “PLA Terms and Concepts: Training, Exercises, & Education,” China Aerospace Studies Institute,
undated, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=fPXsLbsP_Ik%3D&portalid=10.
26
27

28

The updated PLAN OMTE (新一代《海军军事训练与考核大纲》) went into effect in January 2010, one year after
the PLA-wide OMTE. See 秦若云，庹新国，吕海华 [Qin Ruoyun, Tuo Xinguo, and Lü Haihua], 院校教学，如何与新
大纲对接？ [“How do PME Institutions Get On Board with the New OMTE?”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], March 16,
2010, p. 3.
29
For example, open source Chinese materials refer to the OMTE for the Type 022 fast attack craft as the “OMTE for a
Certain Missile Boat” (《某型导弹艇军事训练与考核大纲》). See 首艇就要首创 [“The First Boat of the Class Must be
a Pioneer”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], October 9, 2012, p. 3.
王素炎，侯瑞 [Wang Suyan and Hou Rui], 轻舟疾驰，战力实现“连级跳”[“Light Boat Gallops, Combat Power
Achieves a ‘Continuous Jump’”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 20, 2013, p. 1. The three VTCs also helped the
China Coast Guard develop its OMTE for its cutters (《海警舰艇训练与考核》). See 李茂生 [Li Maosheng], 新编《海
警舰船训练与考核大纲》试行效果浅析 [“Analysis of the Effects Based on Trial Effects of the Newly Developed
‘China Coast Guard Ship OMTE’”], 公安海警学院学报 [Journal of the China Coast Guard Academy], 16, no. 1
(February 2017), p. 30.
31
Former PLAN Commander Shen Jinlong served as the Director of the North Sea Fleet VTC in the early 2000s. See
Andrew Erickson and Kenneth Allen, “China’s Navy Gets a New Helmsman (Part 1): Spotlight on Vice Admiral Shen
Jinlong,” China Brief, 17, no. 3 (March 2, 2017), https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-navy-gets-new-helmsman-part-1spotlight-vice-admiral-shen-jinlong/
30

According to the PLA’s Dictionary of Military Terms, the official translation of 业务长 (yewuzhang) is “professional
chief.” The position is defined as “the officer within the headquarters at different levels within the navy specifically
responsible for specialized technical work such as navigation, guns/cannons, missiles, underwater weapons,
communications, radar and sonar, mechanical and electrical, nuclear propulsion, chemical defense, rigging, etc. This
32

5

captains lead teams of trainers and serve as senior evaluators and supervisors (discussed below). All
trainer captains are experienced ship commanding officers (COs).33 The mission area expert, a
position unique to the navy, is an officer with deep expertise in a particular subject, such as
navigation, guns/cannons, underwater weapons, communications, radar and sonar, and
mechanical/electrical. 34 They train sailors in the areas of their expertise.

The Origins of Vessel Training Centers
For the PLAN’s first three decades, there existed no organizations dedicated to basic training for
ships. Instead, crews of newly-commissioned or recently-repaired vessels received training at the
operational units to which they belonged. This resulted in inefficiencies and impeded operational
units from focusing on more advanced formation and combined arms training.35 Moreover, there
existed no common training standards or practices across the fleet. In the words of one PLAN officer,
“each unit was a temple, with each monk preaching his own set of scriptures.”36 Some ships went
years without completing basic training, and many COs did not possess required qualifications to
command their ships. Inspired by the practice of foreign navies,37 in January 1980 the PLAN decided
to solve these problems by creating dedicated training organizations—Vessel Training Centers. They
were charged with providing basic training for both PLAN surface ships and submarines.38

officer is the assistant to the chief of staff for each type of specialized technical work.” PLA Dictionary of Military Terms,
pp. 887-888.
任艺 [Ren Yi], 新舰“ 开刃” 显锋芒 [“The New Ship ‘Opens its Blade’ to Show How Sharp It Is”], 人民海军 [People’s
Navy], October 18, 2017, p. 3. For example, Eastern Theater Command Navy VTC trainer captain Yan Hualiang (阎华亮)
was transferred (调入) to the VTC in 2016. Before that, he was the CO of the Type 054A frigate Huanggang. The
Northern Theater Command Navy VTC trainer captain Zhang Mingshuai (张铭帅) was the CO of the Type 056 corvette
Huizhou. See Ren Yi, “The New Ship ‘Opens its Blade’ to Show How Sharp It Is,” p. 3; 闻令而动！全军各部队热血开
训 [“Act on Orders! Troops from All Around the Military Start Training”], 中央广播电视总台央视新闻官方账号
[CCTV WeChat Account], January 6, 2021,
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1688050891422544291&wfr=spider&for=pc; 严德勇，周汉青，倪阳 [Yan Deyong,
Zhou Hanqing, and Ni Yang], “香江第一舰”的和平守望——驻香港部队某舰艇大队惠州舰履行使命纪实 [“The
Peace Watch of the ‘First Xiangjiang Ship’: A Chronicle of the Mission Performance of the Huizhou, a Vessel Based at a
Ship Unit in Hong Kong”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], July 19, 2017.
33

34

Not all mission area experts at VTCs come from the surface force. Underwater weapons expert Ai Dong, for instance,
spent years in the PLAN submarine service before coming to the East Sea Fleet VTC. See 王超，葛正炎 [Wang Chao
and Ge Zhengyan], 为战舰能战“引路” [“‘Leading the Way’ for Warships to Be Able to Fight”], 人民海军 [People’s
Navy], March 1, 2021, p. 1.
江汝标，邓海明 [Jiang Rubiao and Deng Haiming], 海军各舰队设立舰艇训练中心 [“Each of the Navy’s Fleets
Establishes a Vessel Training Center”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 6, 1988. In 1980, the PLAN surface force
conducted three levels of training: basic, “ship-type” (舰种, i.e., ships of the same type), and combined arms (合成). Since
basic training was so poor, PLAN ships rarely did ship-type training and never did combined arms training. The main goal
of creating VTCs, then, was to provide conditions for more advanced combined arms training. See 陆石生，孙新华，黄
代培 [Lu Shisheng, Sun Xinhua, and Huang Daipei] 从“原地踏步走”到“一步一层楼” [“From ‘Walking in Place’ to
‘One Step at a Time’”] 解放军报 [PLA Daily], April 4, 1980.
35

See 李湘东，施昌学 [Li Xiangdong and Shi Changxue], 舰艇基础训练成绩全部优良 [“Vessel Basic Training Results
All Excellent”] 解放军报 [PLA Daily], May 4, 1992.
36

俞林森，黄代培 [Yu Linsen and Huang Daipei], 南海舰队成立舰艇训练中心 [“South Sea Fleet Establishes a Vessel
Training Center], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 18, 1980; 许森 [Xu Sen], 构建现代海战场 [“Constructing the
Modern Ocean Battlespace”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], September 15, 1999.
37

乔平、何春喜 [Qiao Ping and He Chunxi], 南海舰队舰艇训练中心越办越好 [“The South Sea Fleet Vessel Training
Center is Getting Better and Better”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], May 17, 1982.
38
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The first VTCs were experimental entities without a formal organizational status.39 This meant their
budgets and staffing were uncertain, their facilities makeshift. Yet by all accounts the experiment
worked, and VTCs provided much-needed training for the three fleets. In 1981, PLAN leadership
reportedly planned to give VTCs formal organizational status within the service, which would give
them more authority and funding.40
By mid-1983, however, the PLAN’s pilot VTCs had been abandoned. One account blames their
demise on the departure of South Sea Fleet Commander, Fu Jize (傅继泽), original champion of the
VTCs. His successor purportedly “lacked the enthusiasm” to carry on with Fu’s reforms.41 But this
claim is unconvincing: Fu stepped down from his post in 1981 or 1982 (becoming Deputy
Commander of the PLAN), and, more importantly, Fu’s departure cannot explain the fate of VTCs in
the other two fleets.42 The dissolution of the VTCs was clearly a senior level decision. At the very
least, ADM Liu Huaqing, who assumed command of the PLAN in 1982, was complicit in their
demise, a fact that surely undermines his legacy as champion of professionalization in the PLAN.43
The VTCs, however, were not gone for long. Inadequate training was blamed for a May 1984
submarine mishap, and the VTC concept was resurrected in the wake of a service-wide conference
held one month later to address the problem.44 By 1986, VTCs had been re-constituted as “pilot” (试
点) programs in each of the three fleets. The results were so positive that in 1988 the Central Military
Commission formally established them as organizational entities within the PLAN. 45
The re-establishment of VTCs was well-timed. Beijing had decided to expand its activities in the
southern part of the South China Sea and the navy was tasked to lead the charge.46 Over the course of
several expeditions to the Spratly Islands, PLAN vessels managed to avoid collisions, groundings, or
other major accidents—despite operating in dangerous (and, to them, largely unknown) waters. More
importantly, the surface force prevailed in a violent clash with Vietnamese naval forces at Johnson

俞林森 [Yu Linsen], 扩大施训范围 舰种增加一倍 [“Expand the Scope of Training, With Number of Ship Types
Doubling”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 30, 1981.
39

张柱坤，张鸣，黄国平 [Zhang Zhukun, Zhang Ming, and Huang Guoping] 且看八十年代第二春 [“And Look at the
Second Spring of the 1980s”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 3, 1981.
40

司彦文 [Si Yanwen], 南海舰队训练中心的起落对改革的启示 [“Lessons on Reform from the Rise and Fall of the
South Sea Fleet Training Center”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], August 19, 1988.
41

See 缅甸驻华武官举行招待会庆祝武装力量日 [“The Myanmar Military Attached to China Holds Reception to
Celebrate Armed Forces Day”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], March 29, 1982.
42

43

Admiral Liu did indeed emphasize the importance of basic training, but apparently not until much later in his tenure. In
an October 1986 article in a PLAN magazine, Liu highlighted how advanced navies (装备技术先进国家的海军) had
specialized units that provided basic training for ships before they joined operational units. He then mentioned how “some
[PLAN] fleets” (有的舰队) already had “pilot” (试点) VTCs, but there were problems impacting their effectiveness, such
as lacking a formal organizational status (编制问题). At this point, he was openly advocating for VTCs, three years after
he had allowed their demise. See 刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清军事文选 (上卷) [Military Writings of Liu Huaqing ( vol.
1)] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2008) pp. 442-445, 501-502.
44
The conference was held in June 1984. In his memoirs, ADM Liu suggests that by 1986 he had come to recognize that
the pilot VTCs were “shortening training cycles” (缩短了训练周期) for basic training and improving training quality. 刘
华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清回忆录 [Liu Huaqing Memoirs] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), pp. 485-486, 489.
Jiang and Deng, “Each of the Navy’s Fleets Establishes a Vessel Training Center.”
John W. Garver, “China’s Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests,”
China Quarterly, 132 (December 1992), pp. 999-1028.
45
46
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South Reef in March 1988, resulting in China’s seizure of the feature. PLAN accounts largely
attribute these successes to solid basic training by the South Sea Fleet’s VTC.47

Training: Getting the Ship Ready to Fight
Training at VTCs begins immediately after a ship is commissioned or completes major repairs. The
ship relocates to VTC facilities and the crew prepare for full-time training. Staff members at the VTC
do a preliminary assessment of training levels aboard the ship and then draft a training plan, similar
to the U.S. Navy’s Afloat Training Groups.48
Training at VTCs occurs at three different levels. First, individual crew members must be trained to
handle the post (or watch station) to which they are assigned. This means starting with mastery of
basic skills—and, in the case of experienced sailors, unlearning bad habits.49 Second, watch teams
must be trained to work effectively as a cohesive unit. Finally, the ship as a whole must be trained to
perform the range of tactical functions for which it was designed.
The OMTE for the respective ship class outlines the training “subjects” (科目 or 课目) that must be
covered during basic training. Examples of training subjects include man overboard recovery,
damage control, use of small arms, underway replenishment, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), air and
missile defense, casualty treatment, and beach assault. In recent years the PLAN has expanded its
training subjects to meet the new requirements of the force. As discussed above, non-war military
operations were highlighted in the 2009 OMTE, and emphasis on “diversifying” the PLA mission-set
has likely accelerated under Xi Jinping.50 To fulfill these new requirements, basic training now
includes non-war subjects such as boarding and arrest, counterterrorism/counterpiracy, and “tracking
and monitoring” foreign warships.51
VTC staff members train ship crews both ashore (港岸训练) and at sea (海上训练). Ashore training
involves heavy use of simulation equipment.52 The shift to a simulator-heavy training approach
began in the early 2000s, when VTCs built facilities to house simulators just then being developed
for the navy.53 By 2002, about 40 percent of shore-based training at the North Sea Fleet VTC was

沈顺根 [Shen Shungen], 海军全训合格舰艇长日日增多 [“Navy’s Certified Vessel COs Increasing by the Day”], 解放
军报 [PLA Daily], September 26, 1989; Si Yanwen, “Lessons on Reform from the Rise and Fall of the South Sea Fleet
Training Center.”
48
Ren Yi, “The New Ship ‘Opens its Blade’ to Show How Sharp It Is,” p. 3; Surface Force Training and Readiness
Manual, p. 2-5.
49
All officers and enlisted stationed at the VTC “must start by studying the most basic operations of their respective posts
and the operating principles of their equipment.” Experienced crew members are expected to rectify any bad habits
developed while assigned to other ships. See 吕廷章，方立华，侯瑞 [Lü Tingzhang, Fang Weihua, and Hou Rui], 战舰
从这里驶向深蓝 [“Warships Depart from Here for the Deep Blue”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 12, 2015.
47

“The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” Information Office of the State Council, April 2013,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2021-06/23/content_10053009.htm.
50

Liu and Sun, “Train the Ability to Win, Sharpen Boldness and Courage,” p. 1.; 刘亚讯，代宗锋 [Liu Yaxun and Dai
Zongfeng], 把战舰交给放心的舰长 [“Give Warships to Trustworthy Captains”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], June 24,
2016, p. 1.
52
Ashore training also includes a classroom learning component.
53
As early as 2002, the PLAN North Sea Fleet VTC had built a facility to house a range of simulators for everything from
navigation to ASW. See 徐锋，许森 [Xu Feng and Xu Sen] 教室操战舰荧屏练战法 [“Operating a Warship in a
Classroom and Practicing Tactics on a Screen”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], April 8, 2002.
51
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done in simulators.54 In 2013, the PLAN called for leveraging VTC facilities to further increase the
proportion of simulation training by the surface force.55 The PLAN viewed simulators as tools to
save time and resources.56 It also learned the value of simulators from studying the practices of more
advanced navies. For example, PLAN experts attributed the U.S. military’s awesome precision strike
capabilities demonstrated during the First Gulf War to repetitive drilling in tactical simulators.57
Today, VTC simulators range from mockups of bridge and combat information center (CIC) watch
stations to facilities for practicing damage control skills. The latter were highlighted when Russian
naval forces visited Zhanjiang, Guangdong in September 2016, during which the two navies
participated in damage control exercises. 58 In October 2022, the Northern Theater Command Navy
unveiled a major new simulation system for training sailors on underway replenishment.59 (See
Exhibit 1 below) The simulation equipment at VTCs is likely the best in the fleet, as even PLAN
personnel not currently stationed at a VTC for basic training use the facilities there to refine skills
during intervals between deployments.60

许森，司彦文 [Xu Sen and Si Yanwen], 北海舰队模拟训练成为演兵场新景观 [“Simulation Training at the North
Sea Fleet Has Become a New Feature on the Training Grounds”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], July 10, 2002.
54

张汉川 [Zhang Hanchuan], 稳中求进，积极推进军事训练转变 [“Seeking Progress While Maintaining Stability and
Actively Promoting a Shift in Military Training”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], January 16, 2013, p. 3. Author Zhang
Hanchuan was the Director of the South Sea Fleet Training Bureau.
55

One PLA Daily article described simulators used for surface force basic training as “accelerators (加速器) for combat
power generation.” See 张金玉，黄敬亮，钱晓虎 [Zhang Jinyu, Huang Jingliang, and Qiang Xiaohu], 创新训练方法提
高训练效益 [“Innovate Training Methods and Improve Training Effectiveness”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], May 30, 2006.
According to one 2020 People’s Navy article on the role of simulators in the service, moving training from the ship to
simulators ashore “reduces training costs, shortens the training cycle, [and] increases training benefits.” 陆松雷，沈飞
[Lu Songlei and Shen Fei], 在“虚拟战场"探寻制胜因子 [“Exploring the Winning Factors on the ‘Virtual Battlefield’”],
人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 12, 2020, p. 1. As early as 1986, Liu Huaqing was calling for the PLAN to develop
simulators because, in his words, they “can greatly save money and munitions and reduce equipment wear and tear.” Liu,
Military Writings of Liu Huaqing ( vol. 1), p. 505.
56

刘庆平，王尤起，米晋国 [Liu Qingping, Wang Youqi, and Mi Jinguo] 北海舰队某舰艇训练中心训练记 [“North
Sea Fleet Vessel Training Center Training Record”] 当代海军 [Navy Today], no. 3 (March 2003), p. 38.
57

This was part of “Joint Sea-2016” (海上联合-2016). See 刘兵 [Liu Bing], 与中俄官兵亲密接触 亲历“海上联合2016”交流篇 [“Close Contact with Chinese and Russian Officers and Enlisted, My Personal Experience with ‘Joint Sea2016’”], 舰船知识 [Naval & Merchant Ships], no. 11 (November 2016), p. 23.
58

59

VTC staff members explained that the new simulator allowed for safer, faster, and cheaper training of crew members
responsible for underway replenishment. See 正式投入使用！央视专题报道的这套训练系统究竟是啥？ [“Officially in
Operation! What is this Training System that CCTV-7 is Reporting On?”], 人民海军微信号 [People’s Navy WeChat
Account], October 24, 2022,
https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzI2NTc3NTY0Nw==&mid=2247716288&idx=1&sn=a9641d2c4a9505c30d3f29cb9
4ff466c&chksm=ea95f2b0dde27ba6647867e0172d272df007bc613c3e327e84934a4a9bcd797243483ec855a9#rd.
60

In the words of the skipper of the Type 054A frigate Nantong, Gu Jun (顾军), simulators like those available at the
Eastern Theater Command Navy VTC allow officers like him to maximize training efficiency during intervals between
deployments, when opportunities for at-sea training are limited. See Lu and Shen, “Exploring the Winning Factors on the
‘Virtual Battlefield,’” p. 1. During intervals between deployments, some crews will go to VTCs to use damage control
simulators. See, for example, 苏坤，王庆厚 [Su Kun and Wang Qinghou], 海洋数字化的探路者 [“Pathfinder for Ocean
Digitization”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], November 21, 2011, p. 3
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Exhibit 1. PLAN sailors train on an underway replenishment simulation system. 61

Exhibit 2. Crew members of the destroyer Qiqiha’er train in a bridge simulator at the Northern Theater Command Navy VTC. 62

61

“Officially in Operation! What is this Training System that CCTV-7 is Reporting On?”

探访海军某舰艇训练中心 水面舰艇战斗力生成的“孵化器” [“Visiting a Navy Vessel Training Center, ‘Incubator’ of
Surface Warship Combat Power Generation”], 国防军事早报 [National Defense Military Morning Paper], October 15,
2020, https://tv.cctv.com/2020/10/15/VIDErBo70P46o96ctSXRX6z7201015.shtml.
62
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Exhibit 3. A CIC simulator at the Eastern Theater Command Navy VTC.63

Despite embracing shore-based simulator training, VTCs also require ship crews to spend a
significant amount of time training at sea, recognizing that success in the simulator does not
automatically translate into capabilities on the battlefield. 64 At-sea training begins soon after the ship
arrives at the VTC. It starts with fundamental skills such a single ship navigation, casualty treatment,
and damage control. Ship officers practice giving clear, concise orders to sailors under their
command. According to one VTC trainer, the primary purpose of at-sea training is to help individual
crew members gain proficiency at their respective posts in different scenarios and to better
coordinate their activities with other crew members—that is, to act as a cohesive unit. Training
activities take place under the watchful eye of VTC training staff, who step in to provide feedback
and alter training plans, as necessary.65
Over time, the focus of at-sea training transitions from basic proficiency to handling complex
scenarios under stressful situations. The experience of the Type 052D destroyer Qiqiha’er is a case in
point. In October 2020, just two months after her commissioning, the Northern Theater Command
Navy VTC took the Qiqiha’er out for seven days of training in the Yellow Sea.66 The training

63
64

See Lu and Shen, “Exploring the Winning Factors on the ‘Virtual Battlefield,’” p. 1.
See Wang, Zhang, Zhang, and Ma, “Basic Training, Foundation for Pragmatically Prevailing in Battle,” p. 1.

某舰艇训练中心：让新入列舰艇早日形成战斗力 [“A Navy Vessel Training Center: Enable Newly Commissioned
Vessels to Quickly Form Combat Power”], 军事报道 [Military Report], CCTV-7, February 26, 2017,
https://tv.cctv.com/2017/02/26/VIDEogj7t6JPbTXGpieM3EK5170226.shtml.
65

直击演训一线·北部战区海军某舰艇训练中心 7 天 7 夜！多艘舰艇展开跨昼夜海上攻防训练 [“Heading for the
Front Lines of Training: Northern Theater Command Navy Vessel Training Center for Seven Days and Seven Nights!
Multiple Vessels Conduct Day and Night At-Sea Offensive and Defensive Training”], 正午国防军事 [Midday National
Defense and Military Affairs], CCTV-7, October 19, 2020,
https://tv.cctv.com/2020/10/19/VIDELHumSKCbwMIVW0EFnG10201019.shtml; See also 张海龙，宫勋， 朱敏煜
66
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involved 20+ subjects, including firing the ship’s main gun against a surface target (an “enemy
frigate”), missile defense (by simulating the firing of the ship’s surface to air missiles and actual
firing of its close-in weapons systems—CIWS), man overboard recovery, and underway
replenishment.67
Basic training at VTCs involves use of live ordnance.68 Surface combatants fire their main guns
against surface targets or targets ashore, CIWS against target drones,69 rocket-propelled depth
charges,70 and surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles.71 Ships engaged in at-sea training also use
onboard combat systems to simulate the firing of missiles and torpedoes.72
Though the focus of basic training is on developing the technical and tactical capabilities of
individual ships, VTCs will organize two or more ships to train together at sea, often for several days
at a time. For example, in February 2021 the North Sea Fleet VTC took out eight ships for five days
of at-sea training in the Yellow Sea. Participants included the Type 056A corvette Zhangjiakou; the
Type 052D destroyers Huai’nan, Qiqiha’er, and Tangshan; and the auxiliary Beilan 770.73
The composition of training groups changes over time, as some ships complete their
training/evaluations and return to the fleet and new ships arrive. For example, in July 2021 the Type
052D destroyer Huai’nan that participated in the February 2021 training event (described in the
previous paragraph), departed with another group of ships for six days of training in the Yellow Sea:
the Dongpinghu (Type-903A), Kaifeng (052D), Xinji (056A), and Dongying (056A). Subjects
included joint ASW with embarked helicopters, fires ashore with main guns, navigating in confined
[Zhang Hailong, Gong Xu, and Zhu Minyu], 连续攻防 7 昼夜 [“Continuous Offense and Defense Over Seven Days and
Nights”], 当代海军 [Navy Today], no. 12 (December 2020), pp. 44-45.
The Qiqiha’er ultimately passed her comprehensive training evaluation eight months later, in June 2021, thereby
becoming a deployable (Class 1) ship. 直击演训场 海军新型舰艇政治工作干部通过全训考核 [“Heading Right for the
Training Grounds, Political Work Officers Aboard a New-Type Warship Pass the Comprehensive Training Evaluation”],
军事报道 [Military Report], CCTV-7, June 5,
2021,https://tv.cctv.com/2021/06/05/VIDE9hPOba237TLoRX8dzLrV210605.shtml; Photo caption, 人民海军 [People’s
Navy], June 18, 2021, p. 1.
68
This is also true for U.S. Navy Basic Phase training. See Surface Force Training and Readiness Manual, p. 3-8.
69
See, for example, early 2021 training by the destroyer Qiqiha’er in which VTC staff launched high-speed target drones
from the ship’s flight deck and directed them to simulate a low-altitude cruise missile attack. 张海龙，杨鸿轩 [Zhang
Hailong and Yang Hongxuan], 迎春寒浪去，带着硬功回 [“Welcome the Spring and See Away Cold Waves, Coming
Back with Solid Skills”], 当代海军 [Navy Today], no. 2 (February 2021), pp. 40-41.
67

70

See, for example, Photo caption, 人民海军 [People’s Navy], March 8, 2010, p. 2.

For live firing of anti-ship cruise missiles, see Photo caption, 人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 11, 2013. In
February 2021, the Northern Theater Command VTC arranged for a PLAN destroyer to live fire a surface-to-air missile.
See 北部战区海军某舰艇训练中心开展舰空导弹发射训练 [“Northern Theater Command Navy VTC Conducts Surface
to Air Missile Training”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 21, 2021, www.mod.gov.cn/power/202102/21/content_4879477.htm.
71

See, for example, 邹向民，朱敏煜 [Zou Xiangmin and Zhu Minyu], 黄海风浪起 新舰练兵急 [“Wind and Waves are
Up in the Yellow Sea and Sailors Urgently Train Aboard a New Warship”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], March 17, 2021,
p. 1.
72

See 直击演训一线·北部战区海军某舰艇训练中心 多艘新型舰艇连续 5 天海上多课目训练 [“Heading to the Front
Lines of Training: Northern Theater Command Navy Vessel Training Center Organizes Multiple Classes of New-Type
Vessels to Conduct Five Continuous Days of Multiple Subject Training”], 正午国防军事 [Midday National Defense and
Military Affairs], CCTV-7, March 2, 2021,
https://tv.cctv.com/2021/03/02/VIDEdDD7J3WnazfTOhC3ApZM210302.shtml.
73
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waters, navigating in heavy winds and high seas, man overboard recovery, navigating while under
tow, use of small arms, and “damage control under combat conditions” (战斗条件下损管).74

Exhibit 4. A ship undergoing basic training at the Northern Theater Command Navy VTC fires a surface-to-air missile.75

邹向民，朱敏煜 [Zou Xiangmin and Zhu Minyu], 五舰齐发，淬火锋刃--北部战区海军某训练中心开展实战化训
练见闻 [“Five Ships Depart Together to Quench their Blades—An Account of Northern Theater Command Navy Vessel
Training Center Conduct of Realistic Training”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], August 4, 2021, p. 2.
74

75

Ibid.
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Ships undergoing basic training probably train in groups in order to reduce organizational and
logistical burdens. If an area of China’s coastal waters must be closed off for ship training, better that
it happen infrequently. Despite going out as a group, the focus remains on individual ships. But in
some cases, two or more ships in the group will operate together to fulfill training requirements. For
example, the preferred PLAN approach to ASW requires multiple ships, aircraft, and other platforms
working in close concert.76 Therefore, ASW training will sometimes involve two or more ships in the
group, plus embarked helicopters.77 Such is also the case for joint search and rescue.78
In at least some, perhaps all, cases, ships engaged in basic training at VTCs conduct more advanced
“formation training” (编队训练). This involves members of a task force operating together as a
surface action group, synergizing their efforts to complete tasking. For example, in October 2021 the
Northern Theater Command Navy VTC took out two Type 052D destroyers (the Huai’nan and the
Kaifeng) and three Type 056A corvettes for five days of formation training in the Yellow Sea. While
at sea, the five ships practiced joint air defense involving simulated attacks against enemy aircraft,
joint fires strikes against enemy-held islands, mine countermeasures, and surveillance and countersurveillance. Video footage of the training shows the ships operating in conjunction with at least one
China Coast Guard vessel, demonstrating the ability of VTCs to enlist forces from other services to
support training goals.79 By contrast, the U.S. Navy defers task force and combined arms training
until after Basic Phase training is complete.80
At-sea training organized by VTCs is designed to be “realistic” (实战化), i.e., to approximate real
combat situations.81 This involves bringing a ship (or small group of ships) to sea and forcing crews
Original Chinese: 联合反潜是未来反潜作战的主要形式. See 范川川，周柏冰 [Fan Chuanchuan and Zhou Bobing],
布下口袋阵智擒 “大黑鲨” [“Set up a Pocket Array to Capture a ‘Great Black Shark’”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy],
March 3, 2016, p. 2.
76

北部战区海军某舰艇训练中心开展海上训练 [“Northern Theater Command Navy Vessel Training Center Conducts
At-Sea Training”]，解放军报 [PLA Daily], October 26, 2021, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2021/1026/c101132264554.html. Fleet helicopter units provide significant support to ships engaged in basic training. Helicopter regiments
will send helicopters to support ASW training. For example, in July 2021 ships undergoing training at the Northern
Theater Command VTC conducted joint training with a North Sea Fleet helicopter regiment. Training benefited both. See
舰机协同砾兵海天 [“Ships and Aircraft Coordinate to Improve in the Air and on the Sea”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy],
July 28, 2021, p. 4. See also 观众提问韦慧晓：舰长全训考核 您是否有百分之百的把握？ [“Audience Asks Questions
to Wei Huixiao: Did You Have 100 Percent Certainty When Taking the CO Comprehensive Training Evaluation”]， 《开
讲啦》 [Voice], CCTV-1, May 5, 2019, https://tv.cctv.com/2019/05/05/VIDE2cQnbZTTDQ7con6u9b3D190505.shtml.
77

邹向民，张海龙，王磊 [Zou Xiangmin, Zhang Hailong, and Wang Lei] 战舰蹈海 劈波斩浪——北部战区海军某舰
艇训练中心舰艇编队海上训练掠影 [“Warship Jump Through the Sea and Smashing the Waves—A Glimpse at Northern
Theater Command Vessel Training Center Ship Formation At-Sea Training”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 5, 2021.
78

北部战区海军某舰艇训练中心：组织多艘驱护舰连续 5 天进行海上编队训练 [“Northern Theater Command Navy
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https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/b9u654vLUiw4XAxEiwrY9A.
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to demonstrate mastery of the training subject in unpredictable circumstances. Ships receive orders to
leave port to respond to a particular crisis—e.g. the menacing presence of an enemy warship—and
must be prepared to cope with threats almost immediately upon departure. Inevitably, the crisis will
escalate and the Chinese ship will be ordered to simulate an attack on the enemy combatant. The
ship’s crew might also be forced to fend off attack from an enemy aircraft or evade an enemy missile.
The purpose of at-sea training is to place crew members under stress to improve their ability to apply
skills developed ashore (in simulators) to real world circumstances. These combat scenarios are
created by VTC staff members, who also observe and critique the crew’s responses to them.82
To further bolster realism, VTCs will sometimes enlist the help of other PLAN units to serve as
adversary (i.e., “blue”) forces. For example, while conducting basic training in 2013, the Type 056
corvette Bengbu trained with a PLAN submarine.83 In December 2015, the Type 052D destroyer
Changsha conducted “confrontation” training with PLAN submarines, aircraft, and other ships.84
The PLAN’s emphasis on “realism” differs from the U.S. Navy’s Basic Phase training, the focus of
which is to ensure that crew members develop the technical skills to perform their jobs. While
creating “realistic” scenarios is cited as a U.S. Navy training aim, it clearly does not reach the same
degree of priority as in the PLAN.85 In fact, unit-level combat scenarios designed to stress the whole
crew only occur during the “Final Battle Problem”—a 2-3 day event at the end of the Basic Phase.86
Moreover, unlike the PLAN the U.S. Navy does not generally involve real aircraft or submarines to
serve as adversary (“red”) forces in the Basic Phase.

浩荡——习近平主席领导推进新时代军事训练纪实 [“Navigating a Strong Army, with an Immense Flow of Iron—A
Chronicle of Chairman Xi Jinping’s Leadership and Promotion of Military Training for the New Era”], 解放军报 [PLA
Daily], November 25, 2020.
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September 2018 People’s Navy article by Wang Mingyong, surface warfare officer and later commander of the PLAN’s
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Keeping Pace with Demand
The VTCs have faced tremendous pressure to keep up with the PLAN’s production of new ships. In
the last 20 years, PLAN shipbuilding has seen two distinct waves. The first wave occurred during Hu
Jintao’s tenure as General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party (2002-2012). In 2004, the PLAN
built the first of what would become a class of 60 Type 022 fast attack craft.87 In January 2008, it
commissioned its first Type 054A frigate. To date, over 30 have been built.88 During Hu’s tenure, the
PLAN also completed smaller production runs of several other new ship classes. This included the
type 051C (Shenyang and Shijiazhuang, 2006 and 2007), Type 052B (Guangzhou and Wuhan, both
2004), and Type 052C (Lanzhou and Haikou, both 2005) destroyers; the Type 071 landing platform
dock (LPD—Kunlunshan, Jinggangshan, and Changbaishan, respectively, 2007, 2011, and 2012);
and the Type 072A Landing Ship, Tank (LSTs—nine commissioned between 2003-2004). 89
The second, much larger, wave of shipbuilding occurred after Xi Jinping assumed leadership of the
CCP in late 2012. As production of the 054A frigate accelerated, the PLAN began commissioning a
new class of corvette (officially, a “light frigate”) called the Type 056 (later 056A). The first of these,
the Bengbu, began basic training in March 2013.90 Over 50 have been built in the decade since.91 In
2014, the PLAN commissioned its first Type 052D destroyer, a class that remains in serial
production. Twenty-five of these ships have been commissioned to date.92 On top of that, the PLAN
has built smaller numbers of several other major ship classes, including cruisers (Type 055, officially
a “destroyer,” first commissioned in January 2020), Type 071 LPDs (five commissioned between
2016-2020), Type 072A LSTs (six commissioned between 2015-2016), Type 075 landing helicopter
docks (LHDs—first commissioned in April 2021, three to date), and a growing fleet of auxiliaries
ranging from oilers to hydrographic survey ships.93
The VTCs have been forced to adapt to accommodate both waves of shipbuilding. The first wave
was dominated by the Type 022 fast attack craft. Providing basic training for the crews of these
small, 220-ton boats created a huge challenge for the VTCs. PLAN leadership required them to fulfill
training quotas that greatly exceeded their capacity. To meet the demand, they applied mass training

David Lague, “Insight: From a Ferry, a Chinese Fast-Attack Boat,” Reuters, June 1, 2012,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology/insight-from-a-ferry-a-chinese-fast-attack-boatidUSBRE84U1HG20120601; Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2021),
Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 2021, p. 50, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF ; The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21 st Century, Office of Naval
Intelligence, p. 17,
https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print_Low_Res.pdf?ver=
2015-12-02-081233-733.
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methods.94 For instance, they took sailors training for the same watch stations from four different
boats and had them train together on one boat. Doing so reduced the strain on VTC staff and enabled
the sailors to learn from and compete with each other, thereby improving training efficiency. 95 As
discussed below, the VTCs also required crews to play a more active role in their own training, as
VTC staff could no longer provide “full-service” (全方位服务) basic training for crew members
stationed there. The new training approach purportedly reduced the length of the training cycle by 40
percent and led to “an obvious improvement in training quality.”96
PLAN VTCs suffered from instructor shortages, forcing them to take desperate measures to retain
staff. The experiences of South Sea Fleet VTC trainer captain Yuan Runhui (袁润辉) is a case in
point. He retired from his post at the end of 2006 after 37 years on active duty. Within a few days of
his retirement, the VTC’s Political Commissar visited him at his home to try to rehire him. After
some reflection, Yuan agreed to come back as a civilian on a salary of 800 RMB per month (~$100).
In the three years after he returned to work, he was directly involved in the comprehensive training
evaluations of over 20 ships.97
VTCs turned to operational units for help in expanding their training capacity. The East Sea Fleet
VTC, for example, lacked sufficient berthing spots and training staff to meet training demands. To
overcome this problem, the East Sea Fleet VTC negotiated agreements with other East Sea Fleet
units to share training infrastructure, training staff, and training expertise. As an example, the Type
054A frigate Yiyang (commissioned in October 2010) received its basic training in the first half of
2011. The training and evaluation plan was developed by both VTC instructors and staff from the
destroyer flotilla that owned the Yiyang. The VTC asked flotilla leaders to participate in at-sea
training, subject evaluations, and other training elements. They used the flotilla’s training equipment
to do simulation training on gunnery and navigation. They also invited the flotilla’s personnel to
participate in the evaluation. As a result, basic training was completed in just four months instead of
the normal six.98
To meet the new demand, VTCs began accepting new ships all year round, instead of just once per
year. In 2007, the South Sea Fleet VTC took the lead by implementing a “rolling” (滚动式)
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admissions policy, enabling ship crews to begin training right after commissioning, regardless of
when it occurred.99 Other VTCs soon adopted the same policy.100
All of these efforts seem to have generated a much greater training rate. In 2002, the East Sea Fleet
VTC could only train and certify two ships. But by 2007 it could train and certify 16 ships per
year.101 The South Sea Fleet saw a similar jump. Its training capacity tripled from 2005-2008.102
During the second shipbuilding wave, which continues to the present, the VTCs did not just face a
very large volume of new ships: Chinese shipyards were now producing vessels that were far more
sophisticated than anything that the PLAN had ever operated. This required that VTC instructors
master new technologies. It also placed new burdens on them because most of the crew members
assigned to the new ships had never used such advanced equipment and their relevant training levels
were low. Sailors trained to operate an old mine sweeper or missile boat now had to learn the skills
of the digital age.103
The case of the Type 056 corvette Bengbu illustrates the challenges this presented. In 2012, PLAN
Commander ADM Wu Shengli visited the East Sea Fleet VTC and asked how long it would take to
train the crew of the Bengbu, first ship of the new class of corvettes (commissioned in March 2013).
The VTC Director, presumably Xu Haihua (许海华),104 responded, “the fastest we could do it would
be four months; the slowest should not exceed half a year.” But he quickly had to walk back his
estimate because it did not consider the crew’s lack of preparation for operating an “informatized”
naval vessel. Among a crew of over 100 sailors, three-fourths had come from old sub chasers and
missile boats.105 The Bengbu’s advanced new equipment and systems required changes to manning
requirements, further complicating matters.106 For example, automation allowed a noncommissioned
officer (instead of an officer) to take command of the ship’s main gun.107 This meant sailors needed
to gain experience both with new equipment and new responsibilities. Ultimately it took seven
唐忠平，李根成 [Tang Zhongping and Li Gencheng], 战舰从这里驶向海战场 [“Warships Leave Here for the Ocean
Battlefield”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], April 9, 2008, p. 3. Reportedly, the South Sea Fleet VTC began “exploring” rolling
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months for the Bengbu to complete training and pass its comprehensive training evaluations.108 The
weak technical backgrounds of many PLAN sailors have impacted basic training for other ship
classes, including the Type 052D destroyer.109
During the second shipbuilding wave, the VTCs seem not to have lacked for training facilities, but
staffing shortages remain a severe challenge.110 Instructors work long hours and carry tremendous
burdens. According to one 2017 article about the East Sea Fleet VTC, the organization’s training
tasks had become so onerous that instructors were “spending the majority of their time at their posts
and very little time with their families.”111 To ameliorate these burdens, the PLAN has expanded the
size of VTC training staff, marking a stark contrast with other PLAN units, many of which have
shrunk as a result of the “neck-down” reforms that began in 2017.112
Despite these challenges, the VTCs have managed to ensure that most new ships can be trained and
certified within 6-12 months of commissioning. To be sure, there have been some exceptions. The
first ship of the Type 052D destroyer class, the Kunming (commissioned March 2014), took nearly
two years to complete basic training and all required evaluations.113 But much of this time was spent
resolving problems with new equipment.114 Though outwardly similar to the Type 052C, the Type
052D possesses significant upgrades, including a new main gun and powerplant. It supposedly took
over 600 rounds of live firing to find the right adjustments for the Kunming’s main battery.115
Basic training for the Nanchang, the first ship of the Type 055 class, was not marred by the same
delays. The pace of training was naturally intense. One officer, perhaps with some exaggeration,
reported that a half year into training aboard the Nanchang and he had only been home two or three
times.116 But training and certification were probably still completed within a normal timeframe, as
Wang and Hou, “Light Boat Gallops, Combat Power Achieves a ‘Continuous Jump,’” p. 1; Lü, Fang, and Hou,
“Warships Depart from Here for the Deep Blue.” Basic training timelines for Type 056 corvettes subsequently fell to just
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the Nanchang conducted at least five out-of-area deployments in 2021, including one in March, just
14 months after commissioning.117 (See Exhibit 5 below.) Compare this with the U.S. Navy’s U.S.S.
Zumwalt, first of the class, commissioned in October 2016. She did not conduct her first deployment
until September 2022—nearly six years later.118 Even ships of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer can
require up to two years from commissioning to first operational deployment.119
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Exhibit 5. Out-of-Area Deployments Conducted by the Type 055 Cruiser Nanchang in 2021120
Date

Summary

18-25 March

Surface action group comprising the destroyers Nanchang and Chengdu and the frigate Daqing
operates in the Sea of Japan.

3-26 April

Liaoning strike group operates in the Philippine Sea for three weeks. Strike group includes the
destroyers Nanchang, Chengdu, and Taiyuan, the frigate Huanggang, and the fast combat support
ship Hulunhu.

22 August 11 September

Surface action group comprising the destroyers Nanchang and Guiyang and the replenishment ship
Kekexilihu circumnavigates the Japanese main islands via the Tsushima Strait, Soya Strait, and
Osumi Strait.

11-22
October

Surface task force comprising the destroyers Nanchang and Kunming, the frigates Guizhou and
Liuzhou, the replenishment ship Dongpinghu, and a submarine rescue ship enter the Sea of Japan to
participate in a bi-lateral exercise with Russian Navy (Joint Sea-2021). Subsequently, the Chinese
task force joins with a Russian Navy task force to enter the Pacific Ocean via the Tsugaru Strait.
The combined task force then returns to the East China Sea via the Osumi Strait.

16-25
December

Liaoning strike group including the destroyer Nanchang, frigate Rizhao, and fast combat support
ship Hulunhu operates in the Philippine Sea, sailing there and back via the Miyako Strait.

Improving Training Quality
At the same time that VTCs have strived to expand capacity, they have also sought to improve the
quality of the training they provide. This has not been easy.121 At the core of this effort has been the
development and improvement of a system of “training supervision” (训练监察). Initially, in the
early 2000s, this involved the creation of a Training Supervision Department in each VTC, which
later evolved into a set of committees charged with the task of monitoring training quality, providing
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feedback, and (as discussed below) ensuring the integrity of evaluations.122 Training “supervisors” (
监察员) point out problems/failings of individual crew members and weaknesses in the performance
of the ship as a whole.123 They record these problems in dossiers, which can be reviewed by the
training staff and officers aboard the ship undergoing training so that adjustments can be made.124 For
example, Eastern Theater Command Navy VTC training supervisor Liu Zhiwan (刘志皖) noted
eleven specific problems during a 2017 ASW training event. Among these, “the ship CO’s tactical
awareness was not strong, the sonar operator lacked a clear mastery of the [tactical] situation, and the
towed array was deployed at the wrong time.”125
VTCs’ pedagogy has evolved over time to foster better training outcomes. For years, VTCs
employed what was called a “nanny style” (保姆式) approach. That meant that VTC instructors did
the bulk of actual teaching. This approach resulted in passivity among ship officers and “weakened
the initiative” of ship COs. In 2010, the East Sea Fleet VTC, taking its cues from new OMTE
requirements, revised its approach by empowering COs to take greater responsibility in organizing
training for their ships. This reportedly increased the agency and creativity of the COs. Henceforth,
they were responsible for organizing training for “ordinary” training subjects. The CO took the lead,
with VTC staff providing assistance. They were also allowed a greater role in the organization of
more important training subjects. The new approach, called a “guiding style” (指导式), “fully
mobilized the initiative and creativity” of ship COs.126
VTCs have also taken steps to improve the performance of individual instructors. This has been a
challenge, because the knowledge and experience of instructors is quickly rendered obsolete by the
pace of fleet modernization. For example, prior to arriving at the Northern Theater Command Navy
VTC, Senior Captain Guo Genbao (郭根豹), last served as CO of the Type 051 destroyer Yinchuan.
This would have been poor preparation to serve as the lead trainer for a Type 052D destroyer—
which he later did.127 To help remedy these shortcomings, VTC instructors receive professional
Wu, Cao, and Cao, “A Track Bathed in Sunlight,” p. 1. See also Liu, Wang, and Mi, “North Sea Fleet Vessel Training
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development training on new technologies and equipment, military theory and management practice,
pedagogical approaches, and foreign military doctrines and capabilities.128 Moreover, instructors also
study new ship classes as they are being built and consult with equipment contractors to learn how
new equipment functions.129
VTCs have taken steps to ensure a highly-motivated training staff. By 2013, the leaders of the North
Sea Fleet VTC, for example, had concluded that the attitudes of instructors assigned there were too
lax. The problem was that the job was too “stable,” so that some of them “lacked enterprising spirit.”
To stimulate greater zeal for their work, the North Sea Fleet VTC instituted an “incentive
mechanism” and began providing extra compensation for high-performing training captains, trainers,
and mission area experts.130
VTCs have also instituted mechanisms that allow sailors receiving training to provide feedback on
particular instructors or instructional practices. For example, the South Sea Fleet VTC invited sailors
to complete appraisals of their instructors and mission area experts. Staff members with negative
appraisals were reprimanded for their failings.131 Students dissatisfied with the quality of instruction
can also provide feedback directly to training supervisors at the VTC.132

Sharp It Is,” p. 3; 李伟，魏一平 [Li Wei and Wei Yiping], 舰长刘志皖和他的舰 [“CO Liu Zhiwan and His Ship”], 生活
周刊 [Life Weekly], no. 15 (April 21, 2009) http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2009/0421/24689.shtml.
刘洋 [Liu Yang], 某训练中心对执教人员进行能力素质培训 [“Vessel Training Center Holds Capabilities and
Quality Training for Instructors], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], February 9, 2011, p. 2; see also 郭大海 [Guo Dahai], 育德良
将驭新装 [“Gaining New Equipment to Educate Good Military Officers”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], August 2, 2013, p.
3. For a discussion about the approaches taken by the South Sea Fleet VTC to ensure instructors remedy deficiencies in
their knowledge abilities through professional development, see 刘洋 [Liu Yang], 自身素质欠缺，施教怎能服务？ [“If
One Lacks Skills, How Can Serve as a Teacher?”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 29, 2010, p. 1.
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Exhibit 6. A Northern Theater Command VTC staff member observes at-sea training.133

Evaluation: Making Sure the Ship is Ready to Fight
Evaluations are the method by which the PLAN ensures that desired levels of technical and tactical
training proficiency are reached for all training subjects. They are also seen as an instrument—in
their words, a “command stick” (指挥棒)—to force units to train hard and well.134
While stationed at the VTC, individual sailors assigned to the ship must gain certification on their
watch stations. This involves taking and passing written examinations, analogous to U.S. Navy Level
of Knowledge tests, and demonstrating proficiency through formal evaluations.135 The goal is for all
crew members to be certified capable of independently standing watch at their respective stations.136
For an active (i.e. Class 1) ship, the job of certifying individual watch standers falls upon officers in
charge of the relevant department on the ship.137 It is unclear who provides these evaluations while
ships are stationed at VTCs.

“Heading to the Front lines of Training: Northern Theater Command Navy Vessel Training Center Organizes Multiple
Classes of New-Type Vessels to Conduct Five Continuous Days of Multiple Subject Training.”
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The ship as a whole is evaluated on its ability to meet requirements for each training subject.
Requirements are met through subject evaluations (科目考核), akin to “certification exercises”
during Basic Phase training for U.S. Navy vessels. Some evaluations are conducted over multiple
days at sea; others are done ashore in simulators.138 Some elements of these subject evaluations are
extremely fundamental. For example, to evaluate seamanship crews are tested on their ability to pull
into and depart from a pier.139 The crews of ships with deck guns are evaluated on their ability to
employ them against shore and surface targets, both day and at night.140 The Nanchang’s first at-sea
subject evaluation, which occurred in May 2020, four months after training began, was an underway
replenishment.141

Exhibit 7. The Type 055 cruiser Nanchang completes its first at-sea subject evaluation.142
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the Far Seas”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 23, 2014.
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After the ship passes all subject evaluations, it can proceed to the comprehensive training
evaluation.143 Taking place at sea over the course of two or more days, the comprehensive training
evaluation is both a judgment of the competence of the ship’s commanding officer (and other senior
officers) and the competence of the ship as a whole.144 The core focus is on “integrated
offense/defense” (综合攻防), i.e. engaging multiple threats from all three domains (air, surface, and
subsurface).145 PLA media coverage of these events often shows footage of the CO and XO in the
ship’s CIC, issuing orders to neutralize (or avoid) enemy threats. Behind them stand members of the
“evaluation group” (考核组), who judge the correctness of their words and actions given the
situations that they face.146 Other members of the evaluation group are likely dispersed around the
ship, observing the performance of other crew members.
During comprehensive training evaluations, surface combatants will live-fire weapons systems
including main guns, CIWS, and rocket-propelled depth charges. When engaging aerial threats, they
will launch decoys. When engaging enemy submarines, they will simulate the firing of torpedoes.147
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Daily], August 27, 2019.
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To mimic real combat conditions, comprehensive training evaluations are unscripted. Ships put to sea
without any knowledge of the challenges they will face. Therefore, these events are naturally very
stressful for the CO and the crew. PLAN officers often describe the years of preparation and the
culminating event as “more difficult than getting a PhD.”148
To further increase realism, VTCs will involve outside units to serve as “blue” aggressor forces. For
example, in December 2021 the Northern Theater Command Navy VTC organized three ships—the
destroyer Harbin and corvettes Xinji and Songyuan—to participate in a 72-hour comprehensive
training evaluation. VTC staff members responsible for organizing the evaluation enlisted the
participation of other PLAN surface vessels, at least one PLAN submarine, PLAN early warning and
strike aircraft, PLAN observation and communications stations, and electronic warfare forces.149

Exhibit 8. Chief of Staff of the Eastern Theater Command Navy VTC, CAPT Zhang Jinjun,
discusses the importance of "realism" during comprehensive training evaluations. CAPT Zhang's
red badge identifies him as the head of the evaluation group for this particular evaluation.150
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Satisfactorily completing the comprehensive training evaluation allows the ship to return to its
operational unit as a deployable (Class 1) ship.151 Some ships are immediately deployed on major
tasks—including out-of-area operations. For example, the Type 052C destroyer Changchun,
commissioned in January 2013, completed training/evaluations in January 2014 and was deployed to
the Gulf of Aden less than two months later as the command ship of the 17th counter-piracy escort
task force (ETF).152 The Type 903 replenishment ship Chaohu, commissioned in September 2013,
also participated in the 17th ETF right after completing the comprehensive training evaluation. The
Chaohu ultimately deployed for 367 days, supporting both the 17th ETF and 18th ETF, including
during operations to locate the wreckage of flight MH370 in the Indian Ocean.153
By contrast, the U.S. Navy’s Basic Phase training does not have a capstone assessment with the same
finality as the PLAN’s comprehensive training evaluation.154 Moreover, while completion of the U.S.
Navy’s Basic Phase training in theory qualifies ships to conduct some peacetime operations (“phase
zero” operations, homeland security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, etc.), in reality Basic
Phase training is almost always followed by additional training—i.e., Advanced Phase and Integrated
Phase training—before the ship is judged ready to deploy to forward areas.155

Ensuring the Integrity of Evaluations
Evaluations have an enormous impact on training outcomes. If the standards of proficiency in the
evaluation are too low, the ship’s crew would be unable to fully leverage the performance of its
weapons, systems, and sensors, placing the ship at a disadvantage in combat. If the standards of
proficiency are high, but those conducting the evaluations do not fully enforce the standards (i.e.,
their evaluations lack rigor), the ship would likewise not reach its potential as a fighting unit. The
PLAN does not release its OMTEs, so little is known about its standards of proficiency. But it does
openly discuss its struggle to ensure rigorous enforcement of its evaluation standards, which has been
long and not completely successful.
The first challenge to the integrity of evaluations is institutional. Specifically, groups and individuals
who have an interest in high success rates for evaluations have been allowed to play key roles in the
evaluation process. Through the 1990s, the task of evaluating training proficiency was the job of
VTC staff members in charge of training. In PLAN parlance, “whoever organized training did the
evaluations” (谁组训谁考核). This practice was later recognized as hugely problematic, since
trainers had a professional interest in seeing high pass rates because it reflected well on them. As a
result, “training was not realistic and evaluations lacked rigor” (训练不实、考核不严), and ships
judged certified sometimes fell short when conducting real-world operations.156
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The VTCs took steps to mitigate this problem in the early 2000s. Responsibility for evaluating crew
performance was stripped from training staff and assigned to training supervisors (discussed
above).157 Supervisory organizations evolved over time, but the principle remained the same:
namely, to “separate training from evaluations” (训考分离).158
But assigning training and evaluation to different staff members within the same organization is also
problematic, since the organization has a strong interest in passing ships that received training there.
High success rates reflect well on the training organization. In theory, VTCs have rules preventing
senior leaders from directly interfering in evaluation results.159 However, that has not always stopped
them from trying to exert influence.160 Moreover, members of the evaluation group no doubt feel
indirect pressure to act for the benefit of the organization to which they belong.
This conflict of interest was not just a problem in the PLAN. Early in Xi Jinping’s tenure, the PLA
recognized that organizations responsible for conducting training should not also be responsible for
evaluating training outcomes. Doing so resulted in a lack of focused training, obsession with safety,
exercises that were highly scripted (演习念稿子), formalism (形式主义; i.e., focus on image, not
substance), and a tendency to fake results (弄虚作假). To remedy this problem, in 2014 the PLA as a
whole began embracing principles of training supervision that relied on evaluators external to the
organization undertaking training.161
For its part, the PLAN took steps to create “third parties” responsible for supervising comprehensive
training evaluations. By 2016, the East Sea Fleet, for example, was organizing third party “joint
evaluation groups” (联合考核组) to evaluate officers for ship command. This resulted in more
objective evaluations and much higher failure rates.162 By 2018, the Eastern Theater Command Navy
Staff Department had begun sending teams to supervise evaluations of ships that had received
training at the VTC. As a result, according to the VTC Deputy Director, Wu Guoyu (吴国瑜),
“judgments had become more objective and accurate, and some problems with training had been
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exposed more prominently.”163 These accounts suggest that the involvement of the Fleet (now
Theater Command Navy) Staff Department has strengthened the integrity of comprehensive training
evaluations and improved overall training quality.
The second major challenge to the integrity of training evaluations involves institutional culture. Like
in other segments of the Chinese party-state, bribery, cheating, and cronyism are deep-rooted
problem for the PLAN. Because of the high stakes for their careers, officers undergoing training at
VTCs, especially commanding officers, sometimes try to bribe evaluators to divulge test questions or
give favorable evaluations.164 Moreover, VTC staff members face social pressure to cater to past
relationships with the sailors they are evaluating.165 Favoritism of this kind may be a challenge for all
navies, but in PRC institutions there exists a strong culture of reciprocity, in which favors of the past
create social obligations that must be repaid, even if doing so involves morally objectionable or even
illegal behavior.166 In the context of training evaluations, this type of behavior is called “giving
points out of social obligation” (送人情分).167 Lastly, there is a problem with students cheating on
written examinations.168
For at least 20 years, the VTCs have strived to combat these baleful tendencies. Written examinations
and at-sea evaluations are filmed, and evaluator notes receive official stamps in order to “forestall the
giving of points out of social obligation after the evaluation is over.”169 Students caught cheating are
punished.170 VTCs have developed imaginative methods to ensure that members of the evaluation
group provide objective assessments of observed capabilities. For example, the Northern Theater
Command Navy VTC Party Committee now proactively issues reminders—grandiosely called “early
warning information notices” (预警信息函告)—to evaluators about the risks of corruption during
particularly fraught moments in the evaluation process.171
Nevertheless, results have been mixed. Cheating remained enough of a problem in mid-2020 that the
Director of the Northern Theater Command Navy VTC, Chen Zhiguo (陈治国), publicly called for
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“resolutely putting an end” (坚决杜绝) to problems such as cheating on evaluations and the “giving
of points out of social obligation.”172 These problems are not isolated to VTCs. Cheating and
cronyism also pose challenges to comprehensive training evaluations done by operational units
across the PLAN.173

Conclusion
Like other modern navies, the PLAN relies on specialized organizations to provide basic training for
newly-commissioned or recently-repaired surface vessels. These organizations, called VTCs, are
located in each of the three Theater Command navies. Since their creation in the 1980s, they have
played a vital role in transforming PLAN ships—everything from mine sweepers to amphibious
assault ships, but excluding aircraft carriers—into technically- and tactically-competent fighting units
prepared for integration with the rest of the operational navy.
In recent years, VTCs have faced tremendous pressure to adapt to the needs of a rapidly expanding
and modernizing fleet. Beginning in the early 2000s with a wave of new fast attack craft and frigates,
followed later by a surge of new corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, LPDs, LHDs, and
auxiliaries, the PLAN has built dozens of surface vessels at a rate unmatched by any other
contemporary navy, with the most recent classes ranking among the most modern in the world. How
have the VTCs fared in their efforts to translate this latent combat power into real operational
capabilities across the full range of wartime and peacetime missions for which these ships were
designed?
As this report demonstrates, the VTCs have clearly succeeded in their most basic function: providing
enough training to enough crews so that new ships can quickly reach the fleet with an acceptable
degree of readiness. This has been extremely challenging for the VTCs, previously accustomed to
training small batches of ships, with training beginning at the same time every year. To augment
training capacity, they have borrowed training expertise and resources from operational units, altered
internal processes to allow new ships to begin training throughout the year (instead of a single annual
start date), developed mass training methods, embraced the use of simulators, expanded training staff
and training facilities, and required that VTC personnel work as long and as hard as necessary to get
the job done. As a result, VTCs have proven themselves capable of supporting the PLAN’s colossal
shipbuilding program, enabling most new ships to complete basic training within the standard 6-12
months.
At the same time that the VTCs have expanded training capacity, they have also strived to improve
the quality of the training they provide. They have done this through a system of “training
supervision” comprising a staff of officers charged with monitoring training quality and providing
feedback to crew members (and trainers) and soliciting feedback from sailors receiving instruction.
Due to the rapid pace of modernization, VTC instructors may lack first-hand experience with the
weapons, equipment, and systems installed on the newest ship classes. To bridge this knowledge gap,
VTCs provide professional development opportunities for training staff and require them to keep
abreast of new technologies by consulting with shipbuilders and equipment vendors. To ensure a
committed and motivated training staff, the VTCs provide additional compensation tied to job
performance.
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Even if basic training is led by a highly dedicated and knowledgeable training staff working at wellequipped training facilities, training outcomes may still be less than optimal. Much depends on the
standards of competence ship crews are expected to achieve. These standards are defined in training
outlines (OMTEs) specific to each class of ship. Because the PLAN does not release these
documents, it is difficult to gauge how training standards compare with those of other modern navies.
This may only be possible through careful observation of deployed PLAN vessels that have recently
completed basic training.
What is clear is that institutional and cultural problems have undermined the PLAN’s efforts to
ensure that ship crews actually meet all the training standards outlined in the OMTEs. This is done
through formal evaluations over the course of basic training and a final, multi-day comprehensive
training evaluation held after basic training is complete. VTCs have strong incentives to give passing
marks to all ships/crews that they train, because doing so reflects well on them. However, in recent
years the PLAN—following guidance from above—has implemented a system that involves “third
party” entities in the evaluation process. These teams of experts from the Theater Command Navy
Staff Department are more insulated from institutional pressures to achieve high success rates. By
some accounts, this new system is yielding more objective assessments. Perhaps more problematic,
the PLAN continues to be plagued by a culture of corruption, cheating, and cronyism. In some cases,
individual training evaluators accept bribes in exchange for positive evaluations or a preview of
testing content. In other case, they may show favoritism to friends and former colleagues. Recent
reports indicate that these problems with PLAN organizational culture continue to harm the integrity
of training evaluations, despite efforts to mitigate them.
The data presented in this report does not allow for a detailed comparison between PLAN basic
training and U.S. Navy Basic Phase training. Still, some insights are possible. First, training timelines
are very similar. PLAN basic training generally lasts 6-12 months, sometimes longer and sometimes
shorter, largely depending the class of ship and the initial training levels of the crew. U.S. Navy
Basic Phase training is intended to last precisely 24 weeks (5.5 months).
Second, despite similar timelines, PLAN basic training appears to cover more content than U.S.
Navy Basic Phase training. After completing basic training and passing all evaluations, PLAN
vessels are expected to be ready for almost immediate deployment, as single ships or as members of
“ship formations” (i.e., surface action groups). Therefore, basic training includes subjects such as
joint ASW, joint air defense, and joint search and rescue, which the U.S. Navy leaves for later phases
in the training process. Moreover, PLAN basic training concludes with a multi-day comprehensive
training evaluation that certifies that a ship and its CO are ready for action. The U.S. Navy’s Basic
Phase does not.
Lastly, PLAN basic training places much heavier emphasis on training ship crews under “realistic”
combat conditions. The aim is to force sailors to demonstrate competence in unpredictable
circumstances, under stress, and against “blue” aggressor forces enlisted for the purpose. Except for a
2-3 day capstone Final Battle Problem, reserved until the end of Basic Phase training, the U.S. Navy
does not prioritize training under realistic conditions until months later, during follow-on training
phases.
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